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AFRICA'S ADJUSTMENT AND GROWTH IN THE 1980s;
THE WORLD BANK AND THE UNDP; CHARLES HUMPHREYS AND
WILLIAM JAEGER & CO., 31PP., MARCH 1989
1. Introduction
Du'-' , 1 the phenomenal increase in export earnings,
export prices (especially from oil) and the negative real
interest rates in the 1970s in the international capital market,
most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa increased their public
consumption a1,d invC'stment and hence imports. As a result,
some of the cour>'r;l;, resorted to borrowing in the international market tu i";,.; nee imports and when the boom
ended. borrowing (Ontinued. This retarded development in
the region. The World B.rni~ report of 1981, identified
strudural and institutional problems as being responsible
for the region's poor performan(e in the 1980s. The United
Nations in a special session of the General Assembly in
1986, adopted the United Nation ·s Programme of Actirm for
African Economic Recovery ancl Development i 986-90
(UNPAAERD), whd1 recognised the need for African
1.'.0untries to embark on po!il.'.y reforms that will help economic recovery and the revitalization of genuine d;velopment.
The paper, "'Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the
1980s" was written by a team led by Charles Humphreys
and William Jaeger of the World Bank. They reviewed on
Sub-Saharan Africa's economic experience in the 1980s from
a new perspective as against that which was generally perceived as one of crisis and decline caused largely by hostile
external factors. The pa·per was divided into six parts. Part
one is an overview of the causes that led to the region's
current problems. Sections 2, 3 and 4 analytically dis,:uss
the developments in trade and commodity prices, the international community's response with more aid and debt
relief packages. Section 5 assesses the progress made so far
in reforming domestic policy, while section 6 examines the
impact of policy reforms.

1985-1987 achieved by the poorest 34 Sub-Saharan African
countries, with more than a third of them attaining over
4.0 per cent growth per annum. In 1988, the real GDP
growth rate for the region was estimated at about 5 percentage points over the preceding year's level. This substantial improvement was attributed to the adoption of
far-reaching policy reforms by many Sub-Saharan African
countries (Nigeria included).
On a sectoral basis, agriculture, manufacturing and
services shares of GDP grew by 3 '.1, 4.6 and 2 .2 per cent
respectively, while mining recorded a decline of 1 .0 per cent
due to the fall in petroleum production especially in Nigeria.
Real consumption for the region declined during 1986 1987. In 1987. real consumption of the oil exporting countries declined by 5 .4 per cent but rose slightly in the poor
(IDA recipient) countries. The domestic savings rate for the
region w:is only about half the rate for other developing
countries. Also. gross domestic investment declined in real
terms by about 3 .5 per cent a year in 1986 and 1987 with
the decline greatest for the oil exporting countries.
Balance of payments showed that export earning in
nominal terms which dropped by about 40 per cent in the
first four years of the decade. rose slightly in 1984 and
1985 but declined in the following two years. Imports
fell by about the same percentage between 1981-1985
but increased by about 3 per cent thereafter. The marginal
increase in exports and the reduction in imports in 1985
reduced the region's current account deficit to the lowest
in the 1980s. The expansion in the deficit in I 986 emanated
from the huge current accounts deficit of the oil exporting
countries while that of 1987 was due to the deficit in the
accounts of the 40 non-oil exporting countries as a result
of the increase in oil prices.

2. Domestic Performance
Sub-Saharan Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
which grew by 2 .3 per cent per annum between 1985 and
1987 was lower than the region's population growth rate
of 3 .0 per cent but much better than the I .1 per cent decline
recorded over the preceding four years. The region's per
capita GDP was 15 per cent below what it was a decade
earlier.
When Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP was valued at 1980
prices, Nigeria's share was nearly 50 per cent but at 1987
prices, it constituted less than 20 per cent of the average
GDP for the period under review. Applying this new weight,
the GDP growth rate of the region for the period stood
at 2 .9 per cent per annum. Using any of the weighting
methods, it was found that if Nigeria was excluded, the
GDP growth rate was positive and relatively stable since
1980. In either case however, Sub-Saharan Africa continued
to lag behind other developing countries.
The GDP of the five oil exporting Sub-Saharan African
countries (Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, Congo and Cameroon)
recorded an average decline of 2 3 per cent in 1986-1987
as against an average annual growth of 2.7 per cent during

3. The External Performance
Except for oil, the volume of exports grew on the average
by 10 per cent during the period 1985-1987, thereby
reversing the trend in the earlier fifteen years. About nine
out of 45 countries in the region recorded export growth
rate of over 20 per cent in 1986 and 1987. The region's
share of the world trade of non-oil exports which declined
between 1970 and I 983, rose by about 30 per cent in the
following three years, due to good rainfall and the devaluation of African exchange rates. The authors claimed that
if African countries had maintained their 1970 market share
of non-oil exports, that their export earnings would have
been $9-10 billion a year higher in 1986-1987 and that
shortfall was similar in magnitude to total debt service
payments or donor assistance. The export prices of the
primary commodities did not perform well. For instance,
the prices of these commodities fell drastically in 1982 and
by 1986, the average unit value of agricultural export rose
by 27 per cent above the 1982 level. However, when the
primary commodity price was deflated by the price of
manufactured imports it was found that there had been a
g~neral decline. They also stated that since 1975, the decline
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their loans to the region. The multilateral agencies, other
than the IMF, increased their official non-concessional
loans since 1982 (notably the IBRD and ADB) thereby
compensating for the decline in direct bilateral loans. The
purchase from the IMF's regular facilities which are provided
on non-concessional terms, rose by about 70 per cent
between 1980-1983. It has been on the decline since then.
The repurchase from the region to IMF has resulted in net
capital export averaging about $0.5 billion per annum in
1986 and 1987.
For countries that have embarked on various economic
reforms, several special initiatives, such as Special Facility
for Africa (SF A) and the Special Programme of Assistance
(SPA) - for low income, debt-distressed Sub-Saharan African
countrie_s - were set up to help the region. For example,
the SF A in three years ( 1985-1988) was able to increase
adjustment financing and mobilised about $2 billion through
the World Bank's Joint Programme of Action for the region.
The SPA among other things, was to increase IDA disbursement as well as credit from the IMF Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility.
The IMF Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) was to
offer the low-income countries more access to concessional
IMF resources disbursed about $0.4 billion to the region
in 1986-1987 and by 1988, $1.3 billion had been approved
for 22 Sub-Saharan African countries. In late 1987, the
IMF established the Enhanced SAF called ESAF, hoping
to provide new resources totalling $8.4 billion. Five
countries have benefited from ESAF. Resources from both
SAF and ESAF were expected to reverse the negative net
financial flows from the region to the IMF. Furthermore,
in order to coordinate financial assistance to the region,
the UNDP-sponsored roundtable conferences and the
World Bank-sponsored consultative group meetings were
set up in 1985. A total of IO round table conference and
16 consultative group meetings had been held.

in the composite index for non-oil commodities exported
by the region was only half of the decline in the composite
index for all primary commodities exported all over the
world, due to the fact that a greater proportion of the
region's export are tropical beverages.
In real terms, according to the authors, prices of some
commodities had remained constant since 1960 while some
others had declined substantially. Viewed from a long term
perspective however, they said that studies by two different
groups 1 showed that contrary to the general belief, the
prices of non-oil primary goods relative to those manufactured since 1920, had been on the decline while the
second group found that since 1900, there had been an
upward trend in the prices of tropical beverages.
The authors advocated a long term perspective of the
region's terms of trade. For example, the 30 per cent decline
in the terms of trade between 1981 and 1987 should be
viewed in relation to the 74 per cent increase between
1972 and 1981. According to them, despite the current
decline, the region's terms of trade was still 15 per cent
above the 1970s level. Also, the 34 poorest countries of the
region which had persistent decline in their terms of trade
from 1970-1981, levelled off thereafter, except in 1987.
They however, agreed that the instability in the export
earning for the region is traced to fluctuating commodity
prices and concentration on few primary commodities.
4. Capital Flows and Debt
The authors attributed the region's seyere financial
squeeze between 1982 and 1985 to reduced international
liquidity, the global debt crisis, depressed economic growth
and export earnings. At $13 billion in 1987, the total net
flow in real terms remained about 15 per cent below the
1980-1983 average. The region's outstanding and disbursed debt increased from $6 billion in 1970 to $129 billion
in 1987, thereby constituting 100 per cent of its GNP and
350 per cent o'f its exports. On the other hand, the debts
of other developing countries remained at less than half
their GNP, although the region's debt to private creditors is
37 per cent compared with 54 per cent for other developing
countries. Capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s
were constrained as it became increasingly difficult to gain
access to commercial funds. There was also recognition
that the region needed more international concessional
assistance.
The gross disbursement of private long term lending to
the region averaged $3.3 billion in 1986-1987 and of this
40 per cent was not guaranteed by African governments.
Greater proportion of this was given to the six middle
income non-oil exporting group and an insignificant amount
to the IDA countries. This indicated that the region was not
internationally creditworthy. The decline in private lending
and the high debt service of private credit (about $3.8
billion in 1986-1987), mostly obtained at very high interest
rates in the early 1980s meant that the region had been
transferring capital to foreign private creditors since 1984.
The implication is that the new official flows are indirectly
utilized for servicing private debts. Official non-concessional
loans declined since 1984, while bilateral agencies reduced
1

Debts
In 1987, 54 per cent of the region's $129 billion debt was
owed by 34 IDA countries, 32 per cent by 5 middle-income
oil-exporting countries and 14 per cent by 5 middle-income
oil-importers. The IDA countries owed debts equivalent to
100 per cent of their GNP and 500 per cent of exports.
Out of this, 43 per cent comprised long term debts at market
interest rates. However, more than 50 per cent of their
capital inflows is made of grants. The debt service ratio for
this group is high at 49 per cent while that of Sub-Saharan
Africa as a whole is 36 per cent in 1987.
About 12 out of the 45 Sub-Saharan African serviced
their debts regularly, while others tried to reduce their debt
burden through multilateral rescheduling arrangements
and/or the accumulation of arrears.
About 11 OECD, DAC countries have converted about
$1.6 billion concessional debts to grants from 1978-1987
and more countries were beginning to take initiatives to
eliminate the ODA debt to many countries of the region.
The debt service paid on non-concessional debts, which
constituted about 85 per cent of the region's actual debt
service payments in 1987 is the region's burden. About
40 per cent of this is on multilateral debt and ineligible
for rescheduling. Between 1980 and 1987, about $30 billion

"Cuddington and Urzua" and "Grilli and Yang".
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(iii) Government Fmances
Most of the reforms undertaken were aimed at increasing revenue and reducing expenditure. Since 1984 however,
revenue as a proportion of the GDP has generally stagnated
or declined, while foreign official budgetary support
increased. Government expenditure as a proportion of
GDP also increased slightly. Interest payments increased
by about 300 per cent thereby forcing governments to
reduce their wages and salaries (e.g. Ghana and Uganda),
other purchases of goods and services and capital spending.
Despite efforts aimed at reducing fiscal deficit relative to
the GDP since 1984, the deficits remained quite substantial.
It has not succeeded because of poor revenue performance,
constraints in reducing government spending (such as declining real GDP) inability to implement policy reforms and
relatively large foreign concessional lending and grants in
1987.

bilateral and private debt were rescheduled.
A special programme of assistance has been put in place
to reduce the region's debt burden. As such, seven leading
industrial countries at a meeting in Toronto in 1988 agreed
that individual creditor nations would "within a frame work
of comparability" choose from the following three options:
(a) forgiveness, (b) longer maturities and (c) lower interest
rates on non-concessional debts. These have already been
applied to the low income countries, but there is no special
programme for the middle income countries. It was suggested
that the countries should be considered on a case-by-case
basis. In general, the authors concluded that despite the
efforts at rescheduling and in implementing various policy
reforms the expected economic recovery has failed to substantially materialise.

5. Policy Reforms
The World Bank advised that countries with structural
and sectoral distortions should undertake reforms. By
1988, 18 African countries had undertaken structural adjustment reforms while 14 had borrowed to support sectoral
reforms. A greater proportion of the policy measures taken
were in the areas of public finance, public enterprises,
agriculture and the exchange rate. Other areas included
government wage and employment restrain, market liberalisation, price decontrol and improved investment programmes.

(iv) Public Enterprise Reform
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Public Enterprises contribute
significantly to output, investment and employment and
hence a lot of public finance and domestic credit are expended. The reforms are aimed at rehabilitation (financially
and physically), divestiture of small enterprises, and institutional changes such as improving the accounting and
auditing system. As a result, growth in the number of public
enterprises declined while many of them were scheduled
for privatization or liquidation. It was agreed among other
things, that inappropriate pricing policies contributed to
the poor performance of the public enterprises. Financial
flows from government to public enterprises were always
high and constituted in some cases 10 to 15 per cent of
government deficit financing. Public Enterprises also incurred
a lot of debt (locally and externally).

(i) Exchange Rate Reforms
The authors noted that inflation had been higher in
Sub-Saharan African countries than those of its major
trading partners and that lhe domestic currencies (especially
in the West African countries) were over-valued. They
gave the indicators of over-valuation as (a) the difference
between official nominal and parallel • market exchange
rates and (b) the real effective exchange rate index. They
observed that both increased in the 1970s and that by mid
I 980s, the index was 25 per cent higher than it was in the
past decade as against a decline of similar magnitude in other
developing countries. They claimed that devaluation had
helped to offset some of the past high inflation and appeared
to be compensating for the high inflation in the region.

6. The Impact of Reforms
The authors stated that it was difficult to draw general
conclusions about the performance of the region as a whole
because of the severity of distortions, the varied impact
of external shocks and the structural rigidities existent in
Sub-Saharan African countries. The reforms however,
induced better performance in the region. Countries with
strong reform programmes have recorded declines in their
export prices, export earning and terms of trade since 1980
but export prices and terms of trade have fallen more rapidly
since 1985, while countries without reforms have benefited.
The main benefits enjoyed by countries with reform
programmes have been financial flows from bilateral and
multilateral agencies. lmpo1ts were high in countries with
reforms than those without. The support provided by World
Bank and other international donors to countries with policy
reforms goes to demonstrate better performance in many
areas.
Even though substantial devaluation has taken place,
inflation rates are lower in reforming countries than in the
early 1980s. Such countries were able to reduce their real
effective exchange rate. Central Bank's real discount rates,
though still negative, have increased. Fiscal deficit and
real expenditure have been reduced. Agricultural price
policy has favoured farmers by increasing producer prices
for export crops and reduced agricultural taxation as

(ii) Agriculture
The authors pointed out that government's liberal marketing and pricing policies enhanced agricultural output.
As a result of the policy reforms, real producer prices for the
major export crops increased by 16 per cent between
1983 and 1986 in contrast to 30 per cent decline in the
earlier seven years. But in 1987, the trend changed due to
the fall in international prices of the commodities and the
high domestic inflation which eroded the purchasing power
of the producer's income.
Also, when the Nominal Protection Co-efficient (NPC) ts
used to assess the effect of the current agricultural reforms,
it was found that an increase in the nominal producer prices
have always raised the NPC but instead of the expected
effect, it was found that nominal devaluation and rising
international commodity prices lowered the NPC and viceversa. It was also pointed out that emphasis was shifted from
food crops to cash crops because of the favourable prices.
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because they allowed the region to borrow beyond its
international resources, such that it accumulated debts
amounting to 100 per cent of its GNP and to 350 per cent
its export earnings. The recent finding by the Federal
Government of Nigeria, that $4 billion of her own debt is
dubious, is a pointer to the possibility that a substantial
proportion of the region's debt may be unfounded.
It may be a little premature to fully assess the gains
achieved by countries with reform programmes but what
the authors claimed as gains to these countries is still very
suspect. For instance, between 1986-1987, net private
capital flow stood at $3.3 billion while debt service of
private capital stood at $3 .8 billion. This means that part
of the new official flows are being used to service private
debts. If nothing drastic is done to reverse this trend, SubSaharan African countries economies will remain depressed
for quite sometime to come.
If 70 per cent of the region's total debts is at market rate
and if 37 per cent of this is owed to private creditors,
then efforts by multilateral agencies through Special Facility
for Africa (SF A) and the Special Programme of Assistance
(SPA) may not produce the desired effect unless the private
creditors are ready to make sacrifices by taking meaningful
steps to reduce the region's debt burden. The Toronto
agreement by seven leading countries is in the right direction
because if the Sub-Saharan African countries fail to improve,
there will be a contracted market for the products of the
developed nations. If the industrialised countries are genuinely interested in the region's economic recovery, then
partial forgiveness should be adopted in general for SubSaharan African countries. The current case-by-case approach
extended to the middle income countries is ineffective and
unacceptable. Finally, if the economic reforms are not having
the expected effects, the implication is that the measures
so far taken may not be the appropriate prescription for
Sub-Saharan African countries economic problems.

measured by N!>C. They have improved their investment
performance even though this was financed by foreign
assistance. The GDP growth rate appear to be on the increase
in contrast to declines in non-reforming countries.

Comments
Generally, the paper is well written. It makes for easy
reading and brings out the salient points vividly. One can not
but agree with the authors that structural and policy
problems, such as poor public sector management (particularly inconsistencies and non-continuity of policy), rapid
population growth, wars and other internal disturbances
contributed to the relatively poor economic performance
of Sub-Saharan African countries. However, I do not share
the authors' views that hostile external factors were not
largely responsible for the crisis and decline in the region's
economy. Indeed, the most destabilizing factors were the
external shocks contrary to the authors' assertion. For
instance, while analysing the external performance of the
region, they stated that if Sub-Saharan African countries
had maintained their 1970 market share of non-oil exports
that they would have earned an amount equal to their
total debt .service payments. Did the authors assume stable
commodity prices during this period? Would not these prices
have collapsed and been blamed on over-production as in
the case of oil? It is certain that the region's poor performance will persist as long as Sub-Saharan African countries
remain primary producers. According to them, when primary
commodities prices were deflated by the prices of manufactured imports, it was found that they had generally
declined since 1975. However, the authors were silent
on the magnitude of the decline, perhaps to make it appear
less serious.
The authors claimed that many of Africa's primary
products did fairly well in the international market because
they were mostly tropical beverages. This implies that the
region has an edge over many countries in the production
of these beverages but despite this, it is still the buyers
market rather than the producers market. Assuming that it
is true that the prices of the primary commodities have
been constant since 1920 as they claimed, would a huge
export of these commodities have benefited the region as
implied? If it is also true that prices of tropical beverages had
been on the increase since 1900, can these be compared with
the rate of increases in the manufactured beverages imported by the region? Also, the authors did not see anything
seriously wrong with the current decline in the region's
terms of trade as long as it was higher than 1970 level.
The terms of trade for 34 countries in the region which
are mainly primary commodities exporters have been consistently declining between 1Q70 and 1981 and had remained
far below the 1970 level ever since. This implies that SubSaharan Africa has been worse off, because they had
remained exporters of primary products. A pragmatic export
promotion policy should encourage the processing of
primary commodities before they are exported. The report
showed that other developing countries performed better
than the Sub-Saharan African countries because of stronger
industrial base. This should rightly be the focus of SubSaharan Africa.
The creditor countries also contributed to the huge
build-up of external debt by Sub-Saharan African countries

H. N.Okonta
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Research Department.
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